Expanding Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Beyond the Border

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Threats

- Viruses
- Worms
- Malicious software downloads
- Spyware
- Stolen credentials
- Insider Threat
- Denial of service
- Root kits
- Session hijacking
- Agent hijacking
- Man-in-the-middle
- Network spoofing
- Back doors
- Exploitation of buffer overflows and other software flaws
- Phishing
- Audits / Policy / Compliance
- ?????

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Example - Credential Theft

- Widespread compromises
  - Over 20++ sites
  - Over 3000+ computers
  - Unknown # of accounts
  - Very similar to unresolved compromises from 2003
- Common Modus Operandi
  - Acquire legitimate username/password via keyboard sniffers and/or trojaned clients and servers
  - Log into system as legitimate user and do reconnaissance
  - Use "off the shelf" rootkits to acquire root
  - Install sniffers and compromise services, modify ssh-keys
  - Leverage data gathered to move to next system
- *The largest compromises in recent memory (in terms of # hosts and sites)*

Cybersecurity Trend - Reactive

- Firewall everything – only allow through vetted applications with strong business need
- Users never have administrator privileges
- All software installed by administrators
- *All systems running automated central configuration management and central protection management*
- *Background checks for ALL government employees, contractors, and users with physical presence for issuance of HSPD-12 cards (PIV)*
- *No access from untrusted networks*
- *Conformance and compliance driven*
- *It is a war*

Distributed Science Reality

- Collaborations include as many as 1000's of scientists
- Collaborators located all over the world
- Many users never visit the site
- Virtual organization involved in managing the resources
  - ➤ Include multiple sites and countries
  - ➤ Distributed data storage
  - ➤ Distributed compute resources
  - ➤ Shared resources
- Do not control the computers users are accessing resources from
- High performance computing, networking, and data transfers are core capabilities needed
- Authentication, authorization, accounting, monitoring, logging, resource management, etc built into middleware
- *These new science paradigms rely on robust secure high-performance distributed science infrastructure*

Experiments

Atlas
Detector

Compact Muon
Solenoid

Spallation Neutron Source

Ultrahigh Voltage
Electron Microscope

Supernova/
Acceleration
Probe

ITER Tokamak

# NSF Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation

From Ian Foster, Argonne

Links instruments, data, computers, people

Hydrology Synthesis – CUAHSI/NSF

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HydroView

Science Has Become a Team Sport

from Dave Schissel, GA

Systems Biology: "studying *biological systems by systematically perturbing them (biologically, genetically or chemically); monitoring the gene, protein, and informational pathway responses; integrating these data; and ultimately formulating mathematical models that describe the structure of the system and its responses to individual perturbations"* (Ideker et al., 2001 Annu, Rev. Genom. Hum. Genet. 2:343)

Konopka, 2004 *ASM News* 70:163

from Yuri Gorbi, PNNL

Science Requirements for Networks - 2003

Science Areas	2003 *End2End* Throughput	5 years End2End Throughput	5-10 Years End2End Throughput	Remarks
High Energy Physics	0.5 Gb/s	100 Gb/s	**1000 Gb/s**	high bulk throughput
Climate (Data & Computation)	0.5 Gb/s	160-200 Gb/s	**N x 1000 Gb/s**	high bulk throughput
SNS NanoScience	Not yet started	1 Gb/s	**1000 Gb/s + QoS for control channel**	remote control and time critical throughput
Fusion Energy	0.066 Gb/s (500 MB/s burst)	0.198 Gb/s (500MB/ 20 sec. burst)	**N x 1000 Gb/s**	time critical throughput
Astrophysics	0.013 Gb/s (1 TBy/week)	N*N multicast	**1000 Gb/s**	computational steering and collaborations
Genomics Data & Computation	0.091 Gb/s (1 TBy/day)	100s of users	**1000 Gb/s + QoS for control channel**	high throughput and steering

Delivering Climate Data

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- Earth System Grid (ESG) provides production service (secure portal) to distribute data to the greater climate community.
  - ➢ Over 18 terabytes (~40k files) published since December 2004
  - ➢ About 300 projects registered to receive data
  - ➢ Over 22 terabytes of data downloaded (~125K files) with 300 gigabytes daily.
- Analysis results of IPCC data, distributed via ESG, were presented by 130 scientists at a recent workshop (March 2005).

Enabling Access to Climate Data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPCC Downloads (GB/day)

Source and Destination of the Top 30 ESnet Flows, Feb. 2005

U.S. Department of Energy

Office of Science

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Legend:
- DOE Lab-International R&E
- Lab-U.S. R&E (domestic)
- Lab-Lab (domestic)
- Lab-Comm. (domestic)

Y-axis: Terabytes/Month (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12)

Bars (left to right):
- SLAC (US) → RAL (UK)
- Fermilab (US) → WestGrid (CA)
- SLAC (US) → IN2P3 (FR)
- LIGO (US) → Caltech (US)
- SLAC (US) → Karlsruhe (DE)
- LLNL (US) → NCAR (US)
- SLAC (US) → INFN CNAF (IT)
- Fermilab (US) → MIT (US)
- Fermilab (US) → SDSC (US)
- Fermilab (US) → Johns Hopkins
- Fermilab (US) → Karlsruhe (DE)
- IN2P3 (FR) → Fermilab (US)
- LBNL (US) → U. Wisc. (US)
- Fermilab (US) → U. Texas, Austin (US)
- BNL (US) → LLNL (US)
- BNL (US) → LLNL (US)
- Fermilab (US) → UC Davis (US)
- Qwest (US) → ESnet (US)
- Fermilab (US) → U. Toronto (CA)
- BNL (US) → LLNL (US)
- BNL (US) → LLNL (US)
- CERN (CH) → BNL (US)
- NERSC (US) → LBNL (US)
- DOE/GTN (US) → JLab (US)
- U. Toronto (CA) → Fermilab (US)
- NERSC (US) → LBNL (US)
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- NERSC (US) → LBNL (US)
- NERSC (US) → LBNL (US)
- CERN (CH) → Fermilab (US)

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure to Support Distributed Science

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- Preserve
  - ➢ Access to national user facilities
  - ➢ Participation in international collaborations
  - ➢ Ability to host scientific databases and repositories
  - ➢ Innovation and prototyping capabilities
- Protect
  - ➢ High performance computers
  - ➢ Experiment systems
  - ➢ Desktop and laptop systems
  - ➢ Ability to do science
- ***Need to figure out how to preserve and support open science while protecting the resources from cyber incidents***

Robust Science Support Framework

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Web Services, Portals, Collaboration Tools, Problem Solving Environments

- Authentication and Authorization
- Resource Discovery
- Secure Communication
- Event Services And Monitoring
- Data Transfer
- Scheduling
- Data Curation
- Compute Services
- Application Servers
- Asynchrony Support
- Virtual Organization
- Cybersecurity Protections

Current Research Middleware Reality wrt Cybersecurity

- Distributed Science Infrastructure is developed independent of operational cybersecurity considerations
  - Implications of site mechanisms
  - Protections from malicious code
  - Vulnerability testing
  - Interoperability with site cybersecurity mechanisms
  - Not commercial software
- Typically there is a long process of debugging prototype deployments
  - Negotiating ports and protocols with each site's cybersecurity group
  - Debugging unexpected behaviors
  - Debugging middleware security mechanisms
  - Identifying causes of performance problems
- ***This is a cross-agency and international issue***

Science is on the Front Lines

- The techniques needed to protect the open science environment today are needed by other environments tomorrow – Past examples
  - ➢ Network intrusion detection
  - ➢ Insider threat
  - ➢ Defense in depth
  - ➢ High performance capabilities
- A next set of concerns
  - ➢ Reducing credential theft opportunities
  - ➢ Detection of insider attacks
  - ➢ Communication and coordination between components to recognize and react to attacks in real time
  - ➢ Tools which address day zero-1 vulnerabilities
  - ➢ Improved analysis techniques – data mining and semantic level searches
  - ➢ Prevention and detection of session hi-jacking

Current Operational Reality

- Cybersecurity group
  - ➢ Protect border
  - ➢ Protect network
  - ➢ Some host protections
  - ➢ Control access patterns
- System Administrators
  - ➢ Protect hosts
  - ➢ Authorize users
  - ➢ Define access capabilities
- Applications and software
  - ➢ Authenticate users
  - ➢ Authorize users
  - ➢ Open ports/connect to servers/transfer data
- Virtual Organizations
  - ➢ Fine-grained authorization
  - ➢ Policy enforcement

Protecting High Performance Distributed Science

- Coordination between cybersecurity components
  - Border intrusion detection mechanisms
  - Network intrusion detection mechanisms
  - Host security mechanisms
  - Software authentication and authorization mechanisms
- Authentication mechanisms for users who never physically visit the site
- Analysis of cybersecurity data particularly in high-performance environments
- Efficient forensics information gathering
- Cybersecurity as an integral consideration in building middleware
- Proxy mechanisms
- Continuous data collection and data correlation
- Forensics collection including middleware
- Improved recovery capabilities – it is currently weeks to recover a supercomputer
- *A new operations oriented Cybersecurity R&D effort is needed to help protect open science*

Example Advantages of Research and Operations Working Together

- Bro – network intrusion detection
  - ➢ Implemented and deployed through teaming between research and operations
  - ➢ Introduced layered approach to high-speed intrusion detection
  - ➢ Protocol awareness allowed detection of anomalous behavior at the protocol level
  - ➢ Developed policy language and interpreter to describe policy
  - ➢ Research platform for investigation of new approaches and events
  - ➢ Developments based on experience with real traffic and the operational environment
  - ➢ Currently leveraging the Bro communication capabilities to add decryption of encrypted traffic streams

Example2: One-time Password

- Deploying at many sites and facilities to combat credential theft
- Many products out there on the market
- 1-factor, 2-factor, cards, software-based, etc
- Federation an important issue to reduce cost and the number of tokens a user must carry – must be secure to avoid creating cross-site propagation vectors
- Analysis from a cryptographic perspective of the various tools identified important short-comings
- Needs to be integrated with distributed science infrastructure to be fully realized

challenge

pw

challenge

pw

Using OPKeyX in Grid environments

Credential Repository Server

secure mutual OTP-authentication and key-exchange

OTP authentication server

short-lived certificate

pw

user-workstation

Proposed Cybersecurity R&D Program

- Coordination of distributed science software infrastructure with cybersecurity mechanisms
  - ➤ Authentication, authorization, and encryption in the middleware can coordinate with the cybersecurity systems to open temporary ports etc
- Coordination between cybersecurity components
  - ➤ Significantly improve detection of attacks
  - ➤ Notify broadly of attacks as they are identified
  - ➤ Help recognize insider attacks
  - ➤ Improve handling of encrypted sessions
- Improved risk- and mission-based cybersecurity decisions
  - ➤ Research and development of methodologies for cyber assessment
- Tools for the high-performance computing environment
  - ➤ Analysis tools which can efficiently ingest and analyze large quantities of data
  - ➤ Semantic level investigation of data
  - ➤ Security tools for high bandwidth reserved paths
- Improved data collection, forensics, recovery
- ***Focus on practical solutions, integrating middleware security, and working with operations personnel during the development and testing***

Conclusions

- Distributed science has become core to the conduct of science
- Robust, **secure**, and supported distributed science infrastructure is needed
- Attackers are getting more malicious and quicker to exploit vulnerabilities
- Need to set the example for protecting distributed infrastructure
- COTS is a key component of the solution but will not solve many aspects of the problem
- *Need to partner cybersecurity operations, cybersecurity researchers, system administrators, and middleware developers*